Work in Progress
Work in Progress |
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Links to pdf-files will be added, when available.
T.M. McDaniel, M.A. Olson, A.J.H.C. Schram, and F.A.A.M. van Winden, Information in the Dutch Flower Auction.
This paper is inspired by questions and problems faced by the Dutch flower auction in the mid 90s. We provide experimental evidence to supplement the answers that auction theory provides for these issues. In particular, we discuss the effect of supply uncertainty on efficiency and prices (and, consequently, seller revenues) in sequential multi-unit Dutch auctions.
K. Sadiraj and A.J.H.C. Schram, Informed and Uniformed Investors in an Experimental Ponzi Scheme.
We study subject behavior in a laboratory Ponzi scheme. Two types of investors exist: informed and uninformed. Besides having a first mover advantage, the informed have specific knowledge about the viability of the scheme, i.e., they know when it is time to withdraw. We derive theoretical predictions as a benchmark for this experimental game. Our experiments study three treatments, to wit, group size, interest rate and the relative number of informed. The results show that it is possible to create a Ponzi scheme in the laboratory where participation is rational (for a while). Our data confirm the comparative statics predicted by our benchmark: group size has no effect, and both the interest rate and the relative number of informed have a negative effect on the duration of investment. In additional analyses we observe results that are not predicted by our benchmark. Especially the behavior of the uninformed is affected in a way that is not predicted by theory: they tend to show a kind of ‘herd’ behavior by reacting to the choices of the informed. [pdf-file]
J.K. Goeree and A. Schram, Bidding to Give: An Experimental Comparison of Auctions for Charity
J. Brandts, K. Gërxhani and A. Schram: The Role of Social Information Networks on Job Recruitment
J. Brandts, S. Reynolds and A. Schram: Market Power in Supply Function Competition