Forthcoming |
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I. Seinen and A. Schram:
Social Status and Group Norms: Indirect Reciprocity in a Repeated Helping Experiment.
Forthcoming in the European Economic Review.
Experimental evidence is provided showing that indirect reciprocity is important in economic decision making and in the development of group norms. We study a so-called repeated helping game with random pairing in large groups. Pairs consist of a donor and a recipient. Donors decide whether or not to provide costly ‘help’ to the individuals they are matched with. We observe that many decision-makers respond to the information we give them about previous decisions of the recipients, even though this information is based on transactions with third parties. [pdf-file]
A. Schram and J. Sonnemans, Participation Game Experiments: Explaining Voter Turnout. Forthcoming in C.R. Plott and V.L. Smith (eds): Handbook of Experimental Economic Results, Elsevier Science publishers, Amsterdam. [pdf-file]
A. Schram, T. Offerman & J. Sonnemans, Explaining the comparative statistics in step-level public good games. Forthcoming in C.R. Plott and V.L. Smith (eds): Handbook of Experimental Economic Results, Elsevier Science publishers, Amsterdam. [pdf-file]
J. Brandts and A. Schram, Cooperation In VCM Experiments: Results Using the Contribution Function Approach, forthcoming in C.R. Plott and V.L. Smith (eds): Handbook of Experimental Economic Results, Elsevier Science publishers, Amsterdam. [pdf-file]